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NOTES
AN ANALYSIS OF THE DRUNKEN DRIVING STATUTES
IN THE UNITED STATES
In 1953, 18 out of every 100 drivers involved in fatal accidents had
been drinking. By 1954, the figure had risen to 20 out of every 100.'
These figures, limited as they are, indicate a trend-the increasing rate
of drinking drivers-which has caused deep concern to safety and law
enforcement officials for several years. The figures also indicate the
scope to which the problem has already grown-to the point that one
out of every five drivers involved in a fatal accident has been drinking.
With the growing incidence of the offense, the need for a better
understanding of the laws relating to the problem has arisen. Since
all 48 states and the District of Columbia have statutes prohibiting this
behavior, this note will review the legal aspects of the problem and
compare the statutes and the statutory interpretations of the various
states.
Three questions will be considered here:
(1) What constitutes "operation" or "driving" under the various
statutes?
(2) What vehicles these statutes seek to regulate?
(3) What physical locations are covered by the restrictions?
The legal aspects of drunkenness have been covered in numerous
articles, and will not be discussed here.
WHAT CONSTITUTES "OPERATION" OR "DRIVING"?
There are three distinct types of statutes:
(a) Those making it unlawful to "drive,"2
(b) Those making it unlawful to "operate,"'3
1. NATIONAL SAFETY CouNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS, (1955).
2. ALA. CODE tit. 36 § 2 (Supp. 1953); CoLo. STAT. ANN. c. 16, § 187 (Supp.
1953); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 49-502 (1947); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 95'h, § 144 (Supp.
1954); IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2001 (Burns 1952); KAN. GEN. STAT. § 8-530 (1949);
MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws art. 662, § 171 (1951); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2325
(1952); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 168.39 (West Supp. 1954); Miss. CODE ANN. §
8174 (Supp. 1954); NEV. ComP. LAWS § 4351 (1929); N.D. REV. CODE § 39-0801
(1943); Opx. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 115-318 (1940); S.C. CODE § 46-343 (Supp.
1954); Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. § 60-414 (Supp. 1953).
3. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 2412 (1949); REV. CODE DEL. C. 41 § 4111 (1954); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 40-609 (1951); GA. CODE ANN. § 68-307 (Supp. 1951); IowA CODE
ANN. § 321.281 (Supp. 1954); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 189.520 (Baldwin 1943);
LA. CODE CRimv. LAW & PROC. ANN. art. 740-98 (Supp. 1953); ME. REV. STAT. C
22 § 150 (1954); MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 90, § 24 (1954); Mo. REV. STAT. §
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'(c) Those making it unlawful to perform either of the above acts'or
one of them combined with "actual physical control."4
Over the years, those terms have acquired a degree of uniformity
of interpretation among the different states.
To Drive. The courts in most of the states which use the word
"drive" have held that the vehicle must be in actual motion, and that
the defendant must be the cause of this motion.5 It is not necessary
that the arresting official see the car in motion, so long as circum-
stances would indicate that the defendant had moved the car.6 Even
though the defendant may be sitting in the front seat behind the steer-
ing wheel, in driving position, if he did not, in fact, attempt to move the
vehicle, he did not "drive."'7 One judge of the Tennessee Supreme
Court, however, in a concurring opinion, has said that the word "drive"
includes parking on the highway.8 Some of the cases distinguish be-
tween "operate" and "drive,"9 and hold that one who "drives" an
automobile "operates" it, whereas the converse is not necessarily true.10
To Operate. The word "operate," on the other hand, is a much
broader term, including most acts incidental to movement as well-as
the actual movement of the vehicle.
A person "operates" a vehicle under the statutes when, in the
vehicle, he intentionally does any act or makes use of any mechanical
or electrical agency which alone or in sequence will set in motion the
motive power of that vehicle. It includes the setting in motion of the
operative machinery of the vehicle as well as the driving of the vehicle
under the power of the motive machinery."
Starting the engine is almost always sufficient to constitute the
564.440 (1949); N.H. REV. LAWS C. 118, § 16 (1942); N.J. REV. STAT. § 39:4-50
(Supp. 1954); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 70(5). (Supp. 1955); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 20-139 (1953); OHo REV. CODE § 4507.37 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75 § 191,
§ 231 (1953); R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 88 § 4 (1938); S.D. CODE § 44.9922 (1939); VT.
REV. STAT. § 10,287 (1947); WIs. STAT. § 85.13 (1949).
4. ARIZ. CODE AN. § 66-156 (Supp. 1951); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-1027 (Supp.
1953); CAL. GEN. CODE § 367 (1949); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 317.20 (1943); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 31-108 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-727 (1952); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 64-22-2 (1953); OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 93 (Supp. 1953); TENN. CODE ANN. §
59-837 (1955); TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 802 (Supp. 1954); UTAH CODE ANN. §
41-6-44 (1953); VA. CODE § 18-75 (1950); WASH. REV. CODE § 46.56.010 (1951);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 1552 (1949).
5. Underwood v. State, 24 Ala. App. 191, 132 So. 606 (1931), 5 Am. Jura Auto-
mobiles § 771 (1936).
6. People v. Mellor, 302 Mich. 537, 5 N.W.2d 455 (1942).
7. Underwood v. State, 24 Ala. App. 191, 132 So. 606 (1931).
8. Bradam v. State, 191 Tenn. 626, 632, 235 S.W.2d 801, 803 (1950); the Ten-
nessee Supreme Court had previously held with the majority in Line v. State,
191 Tenn. 380, 234 S.W.2d 818 (1950).
9. People v. Kelley, 27 Cal. App.2d 771, 70 P.2d 276 (1937); Bosse v. Marye,
80 Cal. App. 109, 250 Pac. 693 (1926).
10. Ferguson v. State, 198 Miss. 825, 23 So.2d 687 (1945).
11. Commonwealth v. Uski, 263 Mass. 22, 160 N.E. 305 (1928).
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offense.12 A leading case illustrating this is State v. Webb.13 There,
the defendant, who had been drinking, got into his car, which was
parked in an alley. He started the engine, letting it idle while his
companions entered the car. Just as the last person got in, the police
arrived. The court held that this constituted "operation."
Even though a car has no motive power of its own, it may still be
Uoperated." Thus, where a defendant was steering a car which was
unable to move under its own power, but was being towed by another
vehicle, he was held to be "operating" the vehicle. 14 In another case, a
man was found by the police sitting at the wheel of his car, attempting
to get it oUt of a ditch. He was held to be "operating" the car under
the statute, even though the car was hopelessly stuck. The court added,
however, that the emergency might be a mitigating factor to consider
in fixing the punishment. 15 Similarly, the fact that a car is against a
curb and the engine is not powerful enough to move it over the curb
is no defense.161 It is not always necessary that a car's engine be running. In one
case, shifting a gear, allowing the car to roll four feet, was held to be
"operation."' The distance the vehicles moves, however, does not
matter,18 since sometimes no movement at all is necessary.19 This
point has been distinguished in North Carolina, where a defendant was
held not to be "operating" a car when he put his foot on the brake to
keep it from rolling.20
The statutes include vehicles at rest on the highway as well as
those in motion. It is obvious that an automobile stopped on a high-
way, especially at night, can be a real menace,21 and the statutes seem
to take this into consideration. As an injury may be received after
the operator has brought his car to a stop, the word "operation" must
nclude such stops as are ordinarily made in the course of the operation
of motor vehicles.22As in the "driving" cases above, "operation" may be shown by cir-
cumstantial evidence.23 A leading case on this point is State v. Lorey.
24
In that ,case, an officer, hearing a crash near him, looked around quickly
12. State V. Ray, 133 Atl. 486 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1926); but cf. State v. Sullivan,
146 Me. 381, 82 A.2d 629 (1951). See also Note, 42 A.L.R.
13. 202Iowa 633, 210 N.W. 751 (1926), 49 A.L.R. 1389 (1927).
.14. State V. Tacey, 102 Vt. 439, 150 Ati. 68, 68 A.L.R. 1535 (1930); cf. State
v. Roberts, 139 Me. 273, 29 A.2d 457 (1942).
15. State v. Overbay, 201'Iowa 758, 206 N.W. 634 (1925).
16. People v. Domagala, 123 Misc. 757, 206 N.Y. Supp. 288 (1924).
17. Commonwealth v. Clarke, 254 Mass. 566, 150 N.E. 829 (1926); see also
State v. Jalbert, 142 Me. 407, 53 A.2d 336 (1947).
18. Austin v. State, 47 Ga. App. 191, 170 S.E. 86 (1933).
19. State'v. Ray, 133 Atl. 486 (N.J. Sup.' Ct. 1926).
1'20. State v. Hatcher, 210 N.C. 55, 185 S.E. #35 (1936).
2L See Commonwealth v. Henry, 229 Mass. 19, 118 N.E. 224, L.R.A. 1918B,
827'(1918). ' .
22. Stroud v. Hartford, 90 Conn. 412, 97 AtI. 336' (1916).
23. Franklin v. Stdte, 51. Ga. App. 98, l79 S.E. 649 (1935).
24. 197 Iowa 552j 197,N.W. 446_ (1924),
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and saw that two cars had collided. The defendant and his companion
were still in their car, with the defendant limp over the wheel,'too
drunk to get out. The court held that this was sufficient evidence to go
to the jury; that it was impossible under the evidence for this drunken
man to have gotten into the car and at the wheel in the brief period
of time that intervened between the time the officer heard the crash
and arrived at the car.
Likewise, evidence that the defendant's car was found in a ditch,
with the defendant just getting out, the lights on, and the tires still
warm, was sufficient to send the case to the jury.25 And where a de-
fendant's car was left at a county line by a wrecker, and the defendant
was next seen six miles away, out of gas, carrying a can of gas to his
car, operation could be inferred.26
It is sometimes not necessary that the defendant actually. be the
person behind the wheel. A drunken person riding in his own auto-
mobile, in which the driver is drunk,, can be an accomplice.27 He may
have aided in or caused the operation by the drunkenperson, and thus
be subject to indictment.28 However, mere ownership alone is not
enough to convict. The defendant must know of the intoxication of the
driver, or must be directing him.29 Where the driver of the defendant's
car is intoxicated and the defendant is too drunk to know what is going
on, knowledge is not imputed to the defendant. 30
A similar situation is presented where the defendant-owner permits
an unlicensed operator to drive. The courts seem to distinguish this
from the previous situation, however, and say that serving as sponsor
for another who does all the driving does not constitute "operation."3'
The statute, according to the Massachusetts courts, refers to actual
physical control.32
It. is not even necessary that the defendant be the person intoxicated.
In North Carolina, a defendant, owner of a truck, was riding as ,a
passenger, letting an intoxicated person drive. He was held equally
guilty with the driver.33 The court said:
"When an owner places his motor vehicle in the hands of an intoxi-
cated driver, sits by his side, and permits him, without protest, to
operate the vehicle on a public highway, while in a state of intoxica-
tion, he is as guilty as the man at the wheel."3 4
25. State v. Boyle, 230 Iowa 305, 297 N.W. 312 (1941).
26. State v. Kissinger, 343 Mo. 781, 123 S.W.2d 81 (1938).
27. State v. Myers, 207 Iowa 555, 223 N.W. 166 (1929).
28. Ibid.
29. State v. Spruill, 214 N.C. 123, 198 S.E. 611 (1938).
30. State v. Creech, 210 N.C. 700, 188 S.E. 316 (1936).
31. Commonwealth v. Jordan, 310 Mass. 85, 37 N.E.2d 123 (1941), 137 A.L.R.
474 (1942).
32. Ibid.
33. State v. Gibbs, 227 N.C. 677, 44 S.E.2d 201 (1947).
34. Id. at 202.
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The pourts impose a duty on the owner, under these conditions, to
know the condition of the driver, especially if they are on a joint
venture. If, however, the driver is not driving for the defendant, the
latter's conduct does not constitute aiding and abetting.35
To Be in Actual Physical Control. Statutes in the third category,
namely, those prohibiting "operating or driving" or "operating or being
in actual physical control," are interpreted much as the statutes pro-
hibiting "operation" alone. Thus, the Texas court has held that
steering a car which is being pushed is "operating or driving."36 And
where a driver stopped his car on a bridge, turned out his lights, and
passed out, he was convicted of manslaughter when the driver of an-
other car was killed by running into the stopped car, the Florida court
determined this to be "operation" under a statute prohibiting "oper-
ating or being in actual physical control. '37
The act of "driving or operating" while intoxicated is an offense
complete in itself, and no other act need be done.38 Recklessness need
not be shown, for that is a separate offense, even though it may be part
of the same act.39 Nor must the defendant do some act he would not
have done had he been sober.40
However, it is not sufficient to show that a defendant was intoxicated
and that he rode in a vehicle while in that condition. There is no
inference from those facts that he "drove" or was "in actual physical
control." "The proofs must go further, and show that he actually
drove the vehicle."
41
VEHICLES THE STATUTES SEEK TO REGULATE
Most statutes employ such as "any vehicle,"42 "any motor vehicle, '43
"any motor vehicle or motorcycle,"'44 to describe the vehicle covered,
but there are others.45
There are comparatively few cases dealing with a definition of these
35. State v. Storms, 233 Iowa 655, 10 N.W.2d 53 (1943).
36. Rogers v. State, 147 Tex. Crim. 602, 183 S.W.2d 572 (1944).
37. Barrington v. State, 145 Fla. 61, 199 So. 320 (1941).
38. Stewart v. State, 108 Tex. Crim. 199, 299 S.W. 646 (1927).
39. Hundley v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 449, 69 S.E.2d 336, 338 (1952).
40. Stewart v. State, 108 Tex. Crim. 199, 299 S.W. 646 (1927).
41. State v. Williams, 141 Wash. 165, 251 Pac. 126 (1926).
42. Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, District of Columbia, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, Utah, Washington, West Virginia. See notes 2,
3, and 4 supra.
43. Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Wyoming. See notes 2, 3, and 4 supra.
44. Georgia, New York. See note 3 supra.
45. California, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Montana, Ohio,




terms. Therefore, in some instances, we must advert to analogy with
other statutes regulating conduct on the highways.
Very little trouble seems to have arisen where the statute used the
broad terminology of "any vehicle" or "any motor vehicle." Where
the term "any vehicle" is used, it would seem to include anything
capable of being propelled, regardless of the motive power, such as
airplanes, ships, ox carts, and even wheelbarrows. Use of the term
"any motor vehicle" would simply limit the above definition to those
vehicles which are propelled by machinery, i.e., other than by animal
or human motive power.
Some statutes specifically set out both "automobiles" and "motor
vehicles;" '46 others say "any vehicle" and add street cars and trackless
trolleys, apparently making some distinction.4 7 Kentucky distinguishes
between vehicles which are not motor vehicles and those which are,
then prohibits operation of both classes. 48 Another state specifically
includes aircraft and vessels, and then as a catch-all, uses the term "or
other means of conveyance."
49
The fact that a motor vehicle has no power does not keep it from
being a motor vehicle.50 "(I) t was the design, mechanism, and
construction of the vehicle, and not its temporary condition, that the
Legislature had in mind when framing the definition of a motor
vehicle."51
For the most part the courts use commonly accepted definitions of
the terms. "Automobile" has been held to be a generic term, and there-
fore it includes trucks52 and motorcycles.5 3 In an insurance case, the
word "automobile" was held to include "automobile truck."' In an-
other case the same holding was apparent under a statute prohibiting
riding on the fender of any automobile. 55
PHYsicAL LOCATIONS COVERED BY THE STATUTES
A majority of the states prohibit driving while intoxicated anywhere
in the state.56 The other states expressly or by implication indicate
46. E.g., Colorado, Tennessee. See notes 2 and 4 supra.
47. Maryland, Ohio, Virginia. See notes 2, 3 and 4 supra.
48. See note 3 supra.
49. Louisiana. See note 3 supra.
50. Rogers v. State, 147 Tex. Crim. Rep. 602, 183 S.W.2d 572 (1944); State
v. Tacey, 102 Vt. 439, 150 Atl. 68, 68 A.L.R. 1353 (1930).
51. State v. Tacey, 102 Vt. 439, 150 Atl. 68, 69, 68 A.L.R. 1353, 1354 (1930).
52. Nichols v. State, 156 Tex. Crim. 364, 242 S.W.2d 396 (1951).
53. People v. Smith, 156 Mich. 173, 120 N.W. 581, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 41 (1909).
54. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tennessee v. Roland, 45 Ga. App. 467, 165 S.E.
293 (1932).
55. Wiese v. Polzer, 212 Wis. 337, 248 N.W. 113 (1933).
56. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Co-
lumbia, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Wyoming. See
notes 2, 3, and 4 supra.
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that they are to be applied only to public highways or streets or, more
generally, to any place where the public has a right of access.
In those states whose statutes are silent about where the offense may
be- committed, it is usually held that the statute applies generally
throughout the state.5 7 It does not have to be committed on a public
road .or street,58 but may be on a private road,5 9 or even in a private
driveway.60 This is not a road regulation, but is a prohibition against
an,.intoxicated person operating an automobile, 61 the offense being
dangerous wherever committed. The statutes are not construed
as being limited in scope,62 and any property, whether road or not, can
be the locus of the offense.63 Even a private dock or wharf has been
held to come within the scope of the statute.64
, In those states which have statutes which are not of general applica-
tion, almost every conceivable public place has been held to come
within the prohibition. The generally accepted test is whether or not
the place is one to which the public has the right of access..
The term "public highway" is almost uniformly held to include
streets. Roads and highways are generic terms, embracing all kinds of
public ways, such as county and township roads, streets, and alleys.
A street is a highway, but a highway is not necessarily a street,65 a
street being just a public highway within a city or town.66 Even that
part of a public square used for driving is a public street.
67
- It, need not always be. proved that a street is a public street. For
example, where a complaint charges that the offense was on High or
Main-'Street, it maybe presumed that the High or Main street of a
particular town is a public street.68 And where a defendant was con-
victed of driving on a street in Los Angeles, the appellate court held
that inasmuch as the street was used by the public as one of the regular
avenues of travel in that vicinity of the city, the jury could find that it
was a public, highway.6 9 However, it is not necessary to set out the
exact road or street in the allegation."
-57., Patterson, v., State,. 128 Fla. 539, 175 So. 730 (1937); 61 C.J.S., Motor"
Vehicles § 629 (1949).
58. State v. Dowling, 204 Iowa 977, 216 N.W..271 (1927); State v. Pike, 312
Mo. 27, 278 S.W. 725 (1925).
59. State v. Carroll, 225 Minn. 384, 31 N.W.2d 44 (1948).
60. People v. Rue, 166 Misc. 845, 2 N.Y.S.2d 939 (1938).
61. State v. Pike, 312 Mo, 27, 278 S.W. .725 (1925).
62. State v. Cormier, 141 Me. 307, 43 A.2d 819 (1945).
63. State v. Dowling, 204 Iowa 9,77, 216 N.W, 271 (1927).
64. State v. O'Grady, 21 A.2d 864 (Ct. Sp. Sess. N.J. 1941; for a case holding
a dock to be a "road" within the meaning of a statute, see Commonwealth v.
Gammonsi 23 Pick. 201 (Mass. 1840).
65. See Blackman v. State, 20 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Crim. App. 1929).
66. People v. Kyle, 341 Ill. 31, 173 N.E. 75 (1930).
.67. Inness v. State, 106 Tex. Crim. 524, 293 S.W. 821 (1926).
68. Curtis v. Joyce, 90 N.J.L. 47, 99 Atl. 932 (1917); aff'd, 91 N.J.L. 685, 102
Atl.10,53 (1918). .' I . ...
.. 69. People v. Kelly, .70. Cal,.App.:519, 234 Pac, 110 (1925).
70. Simpson v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 413, 220 S.W.2d 664. (1949).
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, Where proof is necessary, whether or. not a street or. highway is
public can be proved by circumstantial as well as direct evidence.
71
-, It is not necessary, in the allegation, to name an incorporated city
or town where the street in question is located.7 2 It really makes no
difference whether the street or road is in an incorporated town or
city,73 since the people of towns and villages are as much entitled to
protection from drunken drivers as those of incorporated cities.74
Bridges intended and used as thoroughfares are within the scope of
the statutes concerning "public highways. '75 Turnpikes are also public
highways nothwithstanding the tolls,7 6 since operation of a turnpike
does not differ from any other highway.77 "The term 'public highway,'
in its broad popular sense, includes toll roads-any road which the
public have a right to use even conditionally .... 78
Passage over a fair grounds7 9 or a public park80 would satisfy-the
"public way" statutes; a driveway to which the public has access would
do likewise. 81 Even the driving of a vehicle over the sidewalk entrance
to a filling station comes within a statute which uses the phrase "public
highway," for the highway covers the entire width from property line
to property line. It is immaterial that it leads to private property, if
it is used by the public to get to the station.a2
In People v. TaylorP the New York court held that operation' in a
privately owned parking lot was sufficient to bring the act within the
statute. In that case the court said:
"Judicial notice may well be taken of the fact that enlightened zoning
restrictions are more and more requiring property owners, both busi-,
ness and residential, to provide adequate'off-street parking facilities for
motor vehicles and it would be a dangerous determinatiion to read'
,into the instant statute a limitation upon its 'construction so that one
who operated an ,automobile in such off-street facilities in an intoxi-
cated condition could not be punished therefor."84
Some courts define a public road as one which is used or openfor
use and traffic by the public,85 whereas in a minority of states which
71. Lankford v. State, 70 Ga. App. 76, 27 S.E.2d 349 (1943).
72. Simpson v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 413, 220 S.W.2d 664 (1949).
73. See Lamkin v. State, 136 Tex. Crini. 99, 123 S.W.2d 662 (1939).
74. Blackburn v. State, 150 Tex. Crim. 572, 204 S.W.2d 619 (1947).
75. County Comm'rs v. Chandler, 96 U.S. 205 (1877).
76. See County Comm'rs v. Chandler, 96 U.S. 205, 208 (1877).
77. State v. Maine, 27 Conn. 641 (1858), 71 Am. Dec. 89 (1911).
78. Weirich v. State, 140 Wis. 98, 121 N.W. 652, 653, 22 L.R.A. (N.s.) 1221, 1223
(1909).
79. Canard v. State, 174 Ark. 918, 298 S.W. 24 (1927).
80. State v. Sakowicz, 98 N.J.L. 905, 125 Atl. 322 (1923).
81. Crossler v. Safeway Stores, 51 Idaho 413, 6 P.2d 151 (1931) 80 A.L.R.
463 (1932).
82. State v. Perry, 230 N.C. 361, 53 S.E.2d 288 (1949).
83. 202 Misc. 265, 111 N.Y.S.2d 703 (1952).
84. People v. Taylor, 202 Misc. 265, 111 N.Y.S.2d 703, 708 (1952).
85. Nichols v. State, 120 Tex. Crim. 219, 49 S.W.2d 783 (1932).
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specify a "public" highway or street, the road must, in fact, be a public
one in order to have an offense.86 In these states, it is not an offense to
drive an automobile while intoxicated unless it be driven on a public
road or other prohibited place.87 The evidence in the case must affirm-
atively establish that the operator was on a public road,88 and it must
be averred that the defendant used a public highway.89
CONCLUSION
Most of the decisions on this subject can be explained on the basis
of the purpose of the statutes. 90 Stated plainly, the purpose of the
statutes is to keep drunken people from being a menace to others by
their actions in any vehicle which has an accident potential.
This accident potential is not always limited to the highways or
public places, and some of the states have recognized this fact by mak-
ing their statutes of general application throughout the state, regard-
less of whether on public property or not. After all, a drunken driver
is still a menace to the public when he lets his car roll out of his own
driveway and into the path of other vehicles, or when he runs over his
own children in his own yard. Other states have worded their statutes
to intclude only public places or highways. However, where the latter
type is in use, the interpretations have been broad, in order to carry
out the purpose of the statutes.
Likewise, the accident potential is not limited to automobiles. The
drunken driver of a farm tractor can endanger the lives of others.
This same argument can be applied to the operators of ships, airplanes,
motorcycles, buses, and trucks.
The social objectives behind the statutes seem to be accomplished
best by wording the statutes in terms broad enough to cover any
manipulation of any type of vehicle any place within the state.
J. M. BOYD, JR.
86. Turner v. State, 109 Tex. Crim. 508, 5 S.W.2d 513 (1928).
87. See Sexton v. State, 29 Ala. App. 336, 196 So. 742 (1940).
88. Allen v. State, 74 Tex. Crim. 623, 169 S.W. 1151 (1914).
89. Ex parte Worthington, 21 Cal. App. 497, 132 Pac. 82 (1913).
90. See Terry v. State, 172 Miss. 303, 160 So. 574 (1935).
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